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THE WETLANDS CONTROVERSY: A COASTAL CONCERN
WASHES INLAND
I. Introduction
The mid-1960's and early 1970's have evidenced increasing legislative
recognition of the importance of coastal wetlands as natural resources.' A con-
current development has been a judicial concern that this recognition may be
affecting traditional constitutional safeguards against government appropriation
of private property. These legislative and judicial developments may provide
sufficient indicia of the probable success that interior states will have in formula-
ting and implementing wetlands regulatory statutes.
The term "wetlands" has a broad definitional base which includes not only
the salt marshes and tidal flats of the northeastern coastal states, but also the
mangrove swamps of the southeastern states, and the lake and riverine marshes,
bogs and regularly inundated lowlands of the interior states.2 Previously, such
wetlands had been regarded as wasteland; however, it is now recognized that
they provide a number of valuable benefits. Marine food production and flood
abatement are among the most prominent economic benefits of coastal wetlands.
An estimated two-thirds of commercial fish and shellfish depend on these wet-
lands for nutrition and shelter during various phases of their life cycles.3 Tidal
wetlands also serve as effective buffer zones to reduce flooding and hurricane
damage to coastal communities.'
Interior wetlands have the capacity to absorb runoff, to store surface water
and to release it slowly-a process that augments flood control and abatement.5
In areas where soil moisture directly affects crop yield, interior wetlands also
play an important role in maintaining groundwater levels.6 Both coastal and
interior wetlands serve as natural pollution abatement systems by disposing of
water pollutants through oxidation.7 In addition to these direct and indirect
economic benefits, wetlands are important for recreational purposes and provide
necessary wildlife habitat.'
1 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§ 22a-28-22a-45 (West 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 4701-09 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-731 (Supp. 1970); MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 130, §§ 27A, 105 (Michie/Law Co-op 1972); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to
49-27-69 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 483-A:1-to 483-A:6 (Supp. 1973); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-1 to 13:9A-10 (West Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. ENVm. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 25-0101 to 25-0601 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-229 (Supp. 1971);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 2-1-13 to 2-1-25 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. g.§ 62.1-13.1 to
62.1-13.20 (1975).
2 See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, WETLANDS OF THE
UNITED STATES, CIRCULAR 39 (1956).
3 J. TEAL & M. TEAL, LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH 207 (1969). Important
commercial species include the shellfish-clams, oysters, crabs-as well as menhaden, mullet,
striped bass, flounder, bluefish and shrimp. Id. at 205.
4 Tidal Wetlands Act § 1(a), N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 790 (McKinney 1973).
5 CLAWSON, HELD & STODDARD, LAND FOR THE FUTURE 435 (1960).
6 U.S. BUREAU OF SPORT FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE, WATERFOWL PRODUCTION AREAS:
MINNESOTA 8 (1966).
7 Tidal Wetlands Act § 1(e), N.Y. SESs. LAWS ch. 790 (McKinney 1973).
8 See Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional
Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 18-25 (1972) for a more complete accounting of
the value of wetlands.
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The values of wetlands have been legislatively recognized by many coastal
states impressed with the need to conserve an important but dwindling resource.
Because of the increasing demand for coastal residences, developers are rapidly
depleting available ocean-front property, including tidal wetlands.' For example,
since colonial times, Massachusetts has lost approximately twenty percent of its
tidal marshes to housing developments, roads, and dumps.'" Connecticut's tidal
wetlands have been depleted by two-thirds since the turn of the century; over a
corresponding period its shellfish production dropped from a $48 million to a $2
million industry."
State legislation now actively protects a substantial portion of these coastal
wetlands." However, statutes to protect interior wetlands have not been as
widely enacted." This situation exists despite the fact that seven-eighths of the
nation's wetlands are located in the interior, 4 and that these wetlands possess
comparable values and perform many ecological functions similar to those of
coastal wetlands.' 5 Additionally, interior wetlands continue to be decimated by
drainage programs and are now receiving increased pressure from lakefront
developments.'"
That statutory protection is needed to prevent further reduction of valuable
wetlands resources is not widely contested. However, the effect of such statutes
has often been to deprive owners of all practical or productive uses of their
wetlands property. This has raised the complex question of whether restrictions
imposed under a state's police power amount to a governmental "taking" or
confiscation of the property in contravention of state and federal constitutional
provisions." If the state has exceeded the lawful bounds of its power to regulate
for the public good, it may be required to compensate the landowner for the loss
of his property through an eminent domain proceeding. The enactment of
effective legislation for the inland states therefore, involves a series of questions:
(1) who should control the interior wetlands, and (2) how can this control be
economically and constitutionally manifested?
II. Wetlands Inventory: Problems in Identification and Implementation
A. Who Controls the Wetlands?
In some areas a hierarchy of authorities exists to regulate wetlands.
Developers intending to fill privately owned wetlands may be required to obtain
9 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 374 (1972).
10 J. TEAL & M. TEAL supra note 3, at 247.
11 JOHNSON, WETLANDS PRESERVATION 8 (1969).
12 See note 1 supra.
13 Statutes specifically designed to protect interior wetlands include: CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22a-36-22a-45 (West 1973); :MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 40A (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1977); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24-0101 to 24-1105 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
14 CLAWSON, HELD & STODDARD supra note 5, at 433 (1960).
15 Compare N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0105(6) (McKinney Supp. 1975) with
Tidal Wetlands Act § 1, N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 790 (McKinney 1973).
16 CLAWSON, HELD & STODDARD supra note 5, at 433 (1960).
17 The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that persons shall not be deprived of
property without due process of law, nor property taken for public use without compensation.
State constitutions have similar provisions.
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permission from federal,"8 state' and local 0 governmental agencies. This series
of hurdles greatly circumscribes freedom in the development of marsh properties
and by itself probably discourages permit applications. It is unclear, however,
to what extent the authority of various agencies supersedes or overlaps one
another.
The authority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to regulate activities
in the coastal zone traditionally has emanated from its responsibility to prevent
obstructions to navigation and enhance the flow of interstate commerce. 2 In-
itially, the Corps was concerned with the regulation of dredge and fill operations
only in navigable waters. Primarily through judicial fiat, the Corps became re-
sponsible: (a) for activities in waters not navigable in fact,22 and (b) for con-
sidering factors other than navigation in its regulation of dredge and fill opera-
tions.2" Recently, federal legislation has given the Corps unprecedented powers
over "waters of the United States.""4 This expansion places the Corps in the
position of regulating interior wetlands never before within its jurisdiction. The
Corps' regulatory authority now covers approximately 60% of the nation's wet-
lands.2"
The Corps' increased authority however, has not gone unchallenged. Con-
gressional debate continues over the wisdom and feasibility of undertaking an
expansion of this magnitude. Indeed, several bills have been introduced which
would contract the Corps' jurisdiction back to the navigable waters criterion.2
Further, the Corps' role in promoting the ecologically unsound stream "im-
provement" (channelization) programs," and their reluctance to abandon
costly and controversial structural flood control programs (dams and levees) in
favor of non-structural alternatives (floodplain zoning) has severely undermined
the confidence of environmentalists in the Corps' sensitivity to ecological con-
cerns. The stream channelization programs in particular have resulted in the
destruction of substantial areas of wetlands.2" Still, the Corps is the only agency
at the federal level with authority to regulate wetlands on a broad scale.
The states' authority over lands lying under tidal waters evolved from the
public trust doctrine.29 This doctrine originated in England where the King was
18 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. II, 1972).
See Note, Federal Control of Wetlands: The Effectiveness of Corps' Regulations Under § 404
of the FWPCA, 51 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 505 (1976).
19 E.g., the Commissioner of the Dept. of Environmental Protection in New Jersey.
20 E.g., Town Plan and Zoning Commissions. See text accompanying note 108 supra,
21 See Note, supra note 18, at 508.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
23 See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 211 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401. U.S.
910 (1971).
24 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972).
25 Houck, Using New Laws to Bring Back Clean Water, 15 NATIONAL WILDLIFE 27
(1977).
26 See Note, supra note 18, at n.77.
27 Stream channelization involves the artificial straightening of rivers and streams so that
flood waters will be discharged more rapidly.
28 See REITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND & RESOURCEs, Three-i (1974).
The Soil Conservation Service alone had completed projects involving the channelization of
more than 6000 miles of waterways at costs estimated to be in excess of $90 million.
29 See Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1918); Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. Rnv. 471 (1970); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Tra-
ditional Doctrine, 79 YAL.E L.J. 762 (1970).
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deemed the owner of tidal lands-those seaward of the ordinary high water
mark." The King's ownership was manifested through two conceptual property
interests: (1) his ownership as a private individual (jus privatum) which was
alienable; and (2) the interest he held in trust for the public benefit (jus
publicum) which was inalienable." These rights were vested in the individual
states upon their admission to the Union. 2
Since America is a country of vast inland lakes, it was considered vital for
states to protect public rights in those lakes capable of supporting commercial
navigation. 3 Accordingly, the basis of the states' sovereign powers was modified
from the British "tidal criterion" in favor of a "navigability in fact" test extend-
ing to freshwater lakes. 4 Some states have broadened the navigability test to in-
clude any water body that receives substantial public use.3
State control over wetlands seemingly is preferable to federal control for
several reasons. First, the state's authority to manage and preserve its own
natural resources is well-recognized. 6 Second, state control reduces the bureauc-
racy inherent with supervision at the federal level to more manageable units.
Third, since each state varies in the nature and extent of its wetlands, states are
uniquely qualified to fashion classification criteria specifically designed to meet
their individual needs. Fourth, regulation programs should seek and incorporate
local input (e.g., through public hearings); this is a more difficult task to co-
ordinate at the federal level. Fifth, the growing success of on-going programs
within several coastal states bespeaks the practicability of dealing with the wet-
lands' problem at the state level of government."
While statutory legislation may establish uniform criteria for statewide ap-
plication, the rights of many county, township or municipal governments to im-
plement more rigorous requirements than those applied by the state have not
been precluded. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted
its wetlands act as establishing only minimum standards for statewide use; local
governments have the power to formulate more stringent regulations subject only
to constitutional safeguards. 8 Thus, the state has not denied municipalities the
right to deal more forcefully with local problems if the need arises. In several
states local governments are directly involved in the evaluation of permit appli-
cations filed at the state level. Despite the obvious usefulness and desirability of
this participation, it is clear that to date the primary mechanism for protecting
wetland resources has been statutory regulation at the state level.
B. Statutory Definition: Scope and Legal Sufficiency
Inventorying wetlands necessarily involves the problem of developing a
30 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-35 (1894).
31 See note 29, supra.
32 152 U.S. at 26.
33 See Kingham, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without
just Compensation, 58 VA. L. Rav. 876 (1972).
34 152 U.S. at 43.
35 See, e.g., Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
36 See Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, 248
(Md. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).
37 See text accompanying notes 54 and 75 supra.
38 Golden v. Board of Selectmen, 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1970).
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consistent and meaningful definition to accurately describe a complex and chang-
ing natural resource. Several northeastern states have formulated definitions
which utilize both the vegetative species which inhabit tidal marshes and the
landforms characteristic of the coastal environment.3 9 While this composite
appears to have worked satisfactorily within the coastal environment, the defini-
tional problem is more acute in the interior states.
Interior wetlands often occur in infinite gradations which tend to defy
systematic categorization and development of legal definitions that can be super-
imposed on the natural environment in a meaningful, repeatable and non-
arbitrary manner. First, zones of vegetation, which tend to occur with sharper
boundaries in coastal areas,4" are often blurred or indistinct in interior wetlands.4
Second, a wider variety of plant species may inhabit interior, freshwater marshes
complicating those wetlands inventories dependent on species identification."
Third, upland species (e.g., red maple or poison ivy) may encroach into pre-
dominantly wetland areas obfuscating the natural upland/wetland interface."
Moreover, interior states may be hindered by laws that cannot be implemented
by reference to biological (vegetation) factors." These factors, when combined
with state budget considerations, substantially increase the difficulty in conduct-
ing wetlands inventories in the interior states. To fully appreciate the disad-
vantages this creates in wetlands protection and enforcement, it is advisable to
first examine those benefits that flow from a statewide inventory program.
C. Wetlands Inventory
Many protective statutes at the state level require that wetlands be mapped
and inventoried.4" The New York Tidal Wetlands Act for example requires the
preparation of maps which identify six categories of coastal wetlands.4" The
State will use the maps as one source of information in drafting regulations to
39 N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 25-0103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974): "'Tidal wetlands'
shall mean and include the following: (a) those areas which border on or lie beneath tidal
waters, such as, but not limited to, banks, bogs, salt marsh, swamps, meadows, flats or other
low lands subject to tidal action, including those areas now or formerly connected to tidal
waters; (b) all banks, bogs, meadows, flats and tidal marsh subject to such tides, and upon
which grow or may grow some or any of the following: salt hay (Spartina patens and
Distichlis spicata), black grass (Juncus Gerardi), saitworts (Salicornia ssp.), sea lavender
(Limonium carolinianum), tall cordgrass (Spartina pectinata and Spartina cynosuroides),
hightide bush (Iva frutescens), cattails (Typha angustifolia and Typha latifolia), groundsel
(Baccharis halimifolia), marsh mallow (Hybiscus palustris) and the intertidal zone including
low marsh cordgrass (Spartina alterniflora)."
40 Areas of salt marsh, for example, may contrast sharply in appearance with the upland
vegetation inhabiting the slightly higher ground landward of the marsh.
41 Personal communication with Daniel Deely, Biologist, Environmental Protection Agency,
Wash., D.C. (May 1975).
42 New Jersey wetlands mapping involved identification of only six saline species as
contrasted with twenty-five species which occur in predominantly brackish or freshwater
marshes. Brown, Wetlands Mapping in New Jersey and New York, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AIi. Soc'Y OF PHOTOGRAMMETRY 385 (1977).
43 Personal communication with Daniel Deely, Biologist, Environmental Protection Agency,
Wash., D.C. (May 1975).
44 See IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-11-2 (Bums 1973).
45 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAw § 25-0201 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
46 The categories are: Littoral Zone, Intertidal Marsh, High Marsh, Coastal Fresh
Marsh, Formerly Connected Tidal Wetlands and 'Coastal Shoals, Bars and Mudflats. Martin,
Brown & Garofalo, Final Report: New York Tidal Wetlands Mapping Program (1975) (pre-
pared for the Dept. of Environmental Conservation by Earth Satellite Corp.).
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identify those uses permitted for each wetlands category, 7 and in the evaluation
of subsequent permit applications.
A number of states48 have selected aerial photomaps45 as a useful and cost
effective means of rapidly identifying and classifying wetlands. Aerial photo-
graphs "freeze" ground conditions at the instant of exposure, providing a per-
manent record of the extent and condition of the wetlands at the time of the
overflight."0 Such overflights may be timed to coincide with the enforcement of
a legislative act or the initiation of a moratorium on development. Traditional
ground surveys, or the extensive use of tidal gauging as alternate methods may
be prohibitively expensive and require such lengthy completion times that many
wetlands would be lost before the protective legislation could be implemented."'
Additionally, these traditional methods provide no readily accessible record of
the wetlands' condition at the time the law became effective; no reference base
would exist against which possible infractions could be later checked and
verified.
The aerial photographic method can be employed using two separate ap-
proaches. First, black-and-white infrared (BWIR) aerial photographs can be
acquired at the "instant" of mean high water as indicated by tide gauges posi-
tioned on the ground. Because of the unique imaging properties of BWIR
photography, 2 the land/water interface will be sharply demarcated on the
photographs as a light/dark boundary at mean high tide. However, the effective-
ness of the technique is limited by the fact that the time at which mean high
water occurs may be substantially different over relatively short geographic
expanses of marsh.55 Moreover, the substantial effort involved in coordinating
the air/ground data acquisition may generate prohibitive cost.
Because of these limitations, many coastal states have opted for a biological
approach to aerial wetlands inventory. With this approach, aerial photographs
are acquired over the coastal zone and enlarged to produce photomaps. Skilled
analysts interpret vegetative information from the photographs to delineate the
extent (i.e., where the wetland/upland boundary occurs) and type of wetland
on the photomaps. The State of New York for example has used aerial photo-
graphs to prepare more than 700 maps of its tidal wetlands using the biological
approach. 4
The inventory of interior wetlands poses significant problems not en-
countered in the costal zone. For example, large expanses of marsh tend to
47 See N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAiV § 25-0302 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
48 E.g., New Jersey, New York and Maryland.
49 Photomaps are prepared by enlarging the original aerial photograph and superimposing
map grid coordinates and other features on the enlargement for ease of reference.
50 Martin, Brown & Garofalo, supra note 46.
51 Drs. Wobber & Anderson, Operational Wetlands Mapping Using Multiband Aerial
Photography, COASTAL MAPPING SYMPOSIUM OF THE AMi. Soc'y oF PHOTOORAMMETRY (1972).
See also note 62 supra.
52 Black-and-white infrared photographs are sensitive to visible as well as near-infrared
radiation. Water will appear black on a BWIR photo while healthy green vegetation will be
rendered in very light tones.
53 Along the barrier islands of southern Long Island, for example, high tide might occur
on the ocean beach of a narrow island hours before it would occur on the island's bay side only
a few hundred feet away. Personal communication with William Seestrom, Vice-President,
Mark Hurd Aerial Surveys, Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 1974).
o4 Martin, Brown & Garofalo, supra note 46.
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occur around the shores of lakes, on the floodplains of rivers, or in low-lying
woodlands. Frequently, these marshes are not continuous in occurrence, but are
highly scattered or localized. Inventorying through aerial photographic methods
therefore, may be more costly and time consuming25 Also, the speciation in
freshwater interior marshes is more complex than in saline coastal marshes
requiring more time for accurate identification of vegetation types. 6 These
factors have led some states to forego comprehensive, and perhaps, economically
prohibitive statewide inventories in favor of stop-gap measures more in line with
the state's budget.
The stop-gap approach selectively uses limited resources to achieve maxi-
mum wetlands protection in those areas most seriously in need. However, the
fundamental question of whether a particular area is a state-protected wetland
may continue to be ripe for litigation long after a statute has been enacted.
Because of the variations in wetlands species composition, useful precedents for
determining whether an area will qualify as a statutory wetland may not result
from individual court actions. Thus, this approach suffers from the fact that wet-
lands questions must be litigated, or otherwise decided, without the benefit of a
uniform mapping approach consistently applied throughout the state.
Further, the laws of some states were not designed to be implemented
through a wetlands mapping program. For example, Indiana's attempts to
conserve wetlands are still constrained by the provisions of a law designed to be
implemented using engineering techniques. The law specifically prohibits shore-
line alteration on public freshwater lakes, but gives the state authority over
only those wetlands occurring at or below the legally established level of the lake."
Marshes lying above the established lake level are beyond the protection of the
state. As a further obstacle, determining whether a marsh occurs at or below
the established lake level may be nearly impossible even using engineering
methods. Areas of "floating" marsh vegetation combine with the more con-
ventional problems of surveying in uneven and unstable terrain to make the re-
quired accuracy virtually unobtainable. Responding to this situation, Indiana is
now attempting to draft a wetlands protection act that would define and protect
wetlands by reference to vegetation rather than engineering criteria."
D. Determination of the Mean High Water Line
While vegetation criteria are increasingly being used to inventory wetlands,
one coastal state has taken the additional step of using vegetative differences to
establish the location of its "ordinary" or "mean high water" line. Lands lying
seaward of the line would thus be established as state-owned; property landward
of the line would be privately owned. The use of vegetative criteria signals a
break from the physical mensuration of the mean high water line through tide
gauges,"9 the court accepted method at the federal level. The federally ap-
55 Aerial photographs are more economically acquired over long, continuous flightlines
than over scattered, irregular or intermittent targets.
56 Personal communication with Daniel Deely, Biologist, Environmental Protection Agency,
Wash., D.C. (May, 1975).
57 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-1-1 to 13-2-18-25 (Burns 1973).
58 H.B. 2074, Indiana General Assembly (1977).
59 See Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
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proved method requires a compilation and analysis of recorded tidal observations
over an 18.6 year period6" to establish "the average height of all the high waters at
that place.... .""
While the tide gauge method is sufficiently accurate to locate the mean
high water line, its inherent disadvantages make its widespread use impractical. 2
The New York state courts have adopted an alternative method for ascertain-
ing the location of the mean high water line which they refer to as the "line of
vegetation" test." In Dolphin Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton,4
the New York Court of Appeals rejected the tide gauge method approved by the
Supreme Court" and a third method introduced by plaintiffs in favor of the line
of vegetation test.66 In so doing, the Dolphin court placed greater importance on
the adherence to traditional property lines than on the increased accuracy that
would be attainable through the new techniques. The court strongly emphasized
the desirability of conforming to the landowners' expectations. In divining these
expectations, the court relied on testimony that the long accepted policy of sur-
veyors had been to fix the shore boundary by referring to the "line of vegeta-
tion.""r
The Dolphin method continued to be applied by the New York courts in
Town of Southampton v. Heilner 8 despite an assertion by the plaintiffs that the
mean high water mark should be determined by reference to yet another test.
Plaintiffs contended that because Spartina alterniflora (salt marsh cord grass)
requires daily inundation to achieve vigorous growth, the presence of this species
could be used in locating the mean high water mark.69 The Heilner court con-
ceded that this new method had an unmistakable appeal, but denounced it as not
60 Id. There is a cyclic variation in the rise of water above sea level which has a period of
18.6 years. Id. at 27.
61 Id. at 26.
62 See e.g., Luttes v. State, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958). "[T]he number of tide
gauges along the hundreds of miles of Texas coast . . . is relatively insignificant, while the
number which has been operated as much as a year is smaller still." Id. at 521, 324 S.W.2d
at 180. Using ground investigations, Massachusetts had recorded protective orders for only
18,000 acres of its approximately 60,000 acres of coastal wetlands as of 1971, despite the
fact that the protective legislation was enacted in 1965. However, orders were pending on
another 25,000 acres. BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL 205 (1971). See also text accompanying note 51 supra.
63 This test refers to the method of locating the mean high water mark at the seaward
edge of the marsh grasses and principally Spartina alterniflora (salt marsh cordgrass).
64 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975).
65 "No legal significance attaches to the exact identification [of a line through the use] of
refined hydrographic data." 37 N.Y.2d at 295-96, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
66 The third method, the "type of grasses" test, is based on distinguishing between
Spartina alterniflora (salt marsh cordgrass) which requires daily inundation to achieve high
vigor growth and Spartina patens (salt meadow grass) which grows predominantly in areas
less frequently inundated. See Dolphin Lane Assoc. v. Town of Southampton, 72 Misc.2d 868,
885, 339 N.Y.S.2d 966, 984 (1971).
67 Apparently, the court considered this practice to have been so universal and long-
standing as to have "ripened into a rule of property," which should not be altered even if
scientific evidence esablished that the traditional boundary was in error. 37 N.Y.2d at 297, 333
N.E.2d at 360, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 55. One commentator reports that the court's method will
place the high water mark so far into the bay that at high tide, it will be completely sub-
merged. Humbach & Gale, Tidal Title and the Boundaries of the Bay:'The Case of the Sub-
merged "High Water" Mark, 4 FORDHAM, URBAN L.J. 91, 108 (1975).
68 84 Misc.2d 318, 375 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
69 The Spartina alterniflora test would really be only an extension of the "type of grasses"
test. Primary reliance would be placed on using the presence and location of the grass
Spartina alterniflora to indicate the most inward extent of ordinary (mean high) tidal flow.
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making "societal sense."'7'  Again opting for custom over accuracy, this court
utilized the "line of vegetation" (or "driftwood line" where there was no vegeta-
tion) to establish the mean high water mark. Significantly, the court noted that
applying the method suggested by the plaintiffs might substantially change
property boundaries and act to deprive private landowners of property they had
held for years.
The Heilner opinion highlights the recurrent problem of translating scien-
tific methodology into judicially acceptable formulae. For example, the court
notes "several inherent inaccuracies""1 with the Spartina alterniflora method, in-
cluding the dilemma of where to place the mean high water line when the
Spartina alterniflora occurs in a broad band. By questioning whether the mark
should be properly placed at the landward edge, the seaward edge or in the middle
of the band of vegetation, the court reveals a lack of understanding in the
significance of the proposed test. Since this species requires daily tidal flow to
achieve a high vigor form, the mean high water mark could only occur at the
landward edge of the Spartina alterniflora band.7 2 Further, the court seems sur-
prised by the proposition that the Spartina alterniflora line would not describe
a tidal plane,73 apparently not appreciating that elevation differences in tidal in-
undation may occur over relatively small areas due to differences in bottom
depth, slope and configuration. 4
New Jersey has applied the Spartina alterniflora vegetative test in its wet-
lands mapping program to locate the coastal mean high water line.7 ' The test
is dependent on the fact that the high vigor form of Spartina alterniflora thrives
with daily inundation; the depauperate, or low vigor forms, do not receive
sufficient nutrients to achieve vigorous growth because they are not daily in-
undated. 7' Thus, the boundary between the two vigor types approximates the
mean high water line.
The practical effect of determining mean high water through the use of
vegetative criteria has been to assert state ownership over land 71 which private
landowners have held and paid taxes on-the problem anticipated by the
70 In reaching this conclusion, the court assumed that the settlors of the area were un-
aware of the significance of the location and growth of this predominant tidal wetlands species.
84 Misc.2d at 331, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
71 84 Misc.2d at 333, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
72 The landward-most edge of the Spartinaz alterniflora would indicate that point above
which mean high tidal flow would generally not reach. See note 69 supra.
73 84 Misc. 2d at 333, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 775. But see Note, The Use and Legal Signif-
icance of the Mean -HWgh Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapp:fn 53 N.C.L. Rlv. 185
(1974). "A mean high tide level . . . is not actually a uniform level [but] an undulating line
that varies from point to point. As a result, the intersection of a mean high tide with the land
connects points of differing elevation and forms vertically undulating line." Id. at 246.
74 See Comment, Fluctuating Shorelines and Tidal Boundaries: An Unresolved Problem,
6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 447, 450 (1969).
75 This test was based on studies conducted by Dr. R. R. Anderson, Associate Professor of
Biology, American University.
76 Drs. Anderson & Wobber, Wetlands Mapping in New Jersey, 39 AMi. Soc'Y OF PHOTO-
GRAI mETRY 353, 356 (1973).
77 Id. Where the low vigor form was not present, the delineation of the mean high water
line would be accomplished by separating the high vigor form of Spartina alterniflora from
other salt marsh species such as Spartina patens (salt meadow grass or salt hay) or Distichlis
spicata (spike grass) which generally thrive at elevations above those flooded by daily tides.
78 The state claims ownership of all wetlands occupied by the high vigor form of Spartina
alterniflora. Id. at 353.
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Heilner court. The New Jersey approach nevertheless represents a bold and
timely attempt to assert tight control over a rapidly depleting state and national
resource. The approach used in New Jersey and the regulatory statutes passed
by other states illustrate the competing concerns of the landowner's right to use
his property versus the asserted right of a state to regulate and protect its re-
sources. Litigation arising within a number of states demonstrates that some
regulatory controls have been unable to withstand judicial scrutiny and have
been held to violate constitutional prohibitions against government appropriation
of private property without due process of law.
III. Conflicting Interests:
State Police Power v. Private Ownerships Rights
A. The Lawful Extent of the Police Power
The need for regulation of wetlands is evidenced by the rapid depletion of
wetlands acreages. Regulatory control, however, must be exercised within the
scope of constitutional guarantees. The constitutionality of wetlands legislation
has been challenged on the grounds that: (1) the statute itself is inherently un-
constitutional or, (2) the application of the statute achieves an unconstitutional
result. Assertions that a statute is inherently unconstitutional are usually struck
down in part because of the strong presumption of constitutionality that attaches
to a statute."9 In evaluating a statute's constitutionality, courts generally con-
sider: (1) whether the interests of the public require such regulation,"0 (2)
whether the regulation is excessive for effectuating its own purpose, 8' (3)
whether the regulation acts in a discriminatory, or arbitrary manner,8" or (4)
whether the regulation is unduly oppressive to the individual.8 3
The question of whether a regulatory statute dictates an unconstitutional
result frequently revolves around whether a "taking" has occurred. The Con-
stitution proclaims: "No person shall ...be deprived of . . .property without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."8 4 Nevertheless, states have a recognized right to regulate
the use of private property through the exercise of their police power.8 5 The
police power is validly employed to prohibit uses that would be injurious to the
rights and welfare of the community. Nonetheless, if the power is exercised in a
manner that is unreasonable or overly restrictive, courts may hold that its applica-
tion is unconstitutional. For instance, if the property uses permitted by a statute
79 Petitioner's burden in rebutting the presumption is substantial; the statute will be
upheld if "any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords sup-
port for it." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) quoting United
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938). See also, Orno-Veazie Water Dist.
v. Penobscot City Water Co., 348 A.2d 249 (Me. 1975). "[Fact of unconstitutionality] must be
established to such a degree of certainty as to leave no room for reasonable doubt." Id. at 253.
80 Id. at 595.
81 Id.
82 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
83 369 U.S. at 595.
84 The due process requirement appears in the fifth amendment. The compensation
provision is applicable to the states because it has been deemed to have been incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
85 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
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have been too severely restricted, the property may be judged to have been con-
structively taken. When the police power reaches this magnitude, the state must
exercise the power of eminent domain and compensate the landowner for his
loss. "
Although an overextended use of the police power may raise the need to
exercise eminent domain, the underlying purposes of these two powers vary:
The police power regulates use of property because uncontrolled use would
be harmful to the public interest. Eminent domain, on the other hand,
takes private property because it is useful to the public.8 7
Thus, the distinction is between creating a public benefit rather than preventing
a public harm." Before considering whether wetlands regulation more validly
involves a use of the police power (prevents a harm), or of eminent domain
(creates a benefit), it is useful to trace the development of judicial criteria used
to delineate the boundaries of the two powers.
Initially, a "physical invasion" or appropriation of privately held property
was requisite to the determination that a taking had occurred." The physical
appropriation of land by the government represents a clear example of an un-
constitutional taking, however this criterion has proven inadequate to fully
evaluate the reach of statutory restrictions, 0 especially in the area of wetlands
protection.
In Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,"' the Supreme Court applied a
"diminution in value" test to assist in detecting statutory actions that did not
involve a physical invasion, but nevertheless constituted. a taking. The Penn-
sylvania Coal statute prohibited all deep coal mining operations that would
create surface subsidence. The statute effectively nullified a contract which the
coal company had entered into with the owner of the surface property rights.
The contract would have permitted the company to exploit its subsurface mining
rights regardless of the effect on surface conditions. The Court's opinion rein-
forced the importance of the constitutional prescription against governmental
appropriation:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes
that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for
such use without compensation.
... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.1
2
In dissenting, Justice Brandeis struck a chord that has been echoed by several
recent cases:9 3
86 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
87 Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm., 146 Conn. 650, 654, 153 A.2d 822, 824 (1959).
88 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. 1972), quoting 1 RArHKOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, 6-7 (3d ed. 1974).
89 See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay 'Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
90 Washington Market Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 117, 343 A.2d
408, 413 (1975).
91 260 U.S. 393.
92 Id. at 415-16.
93 See text accompanying notes 119 and 127 supra.
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[T]he right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not so use
it as to create a public nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, owing to
changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare.Y4
Wetlands development is one such activity that formerly was acceptable and
desirable in the eyes of the public, but which now may be considered a threat to
the public welfare.
Although the Pennsylvania Coal decision has been widely cited in floodplain
zoning and wetlands cases, there is some indication that the Supreme Court has
moved toward allowing the states greater latitude in the use of the police power.
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,95 the Court again explored the outer pe-
rimeter of the lawful use of police power. Goldblatt concerned an amended town
ordinance that prohibited a gravel pit owner from excavating below the water
table and required that the present excavation be filled. In upholding the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance, the Court quoted approvingly from a pre-Penn-
sylvania Coal holding that uses injurious to the health, or safety of the com-
munity can be properly restricted because "[s]uch legislation does not disturb the
owner in the . . . use of his property for lawful purposes. . . ."" The Court also
cited another of its pre-Pennsylvania Coal decisions where a 94% reduction in
property value was not considered to be an unconstitutional taking.97 By re-
approving this extreme example, the Court seemed to be moving the "diminu-
tion in value" test out of the spotlight and into the background. Many courts
however, continue to apply the test as one element to be seriously considered in
resolving the "taking" question."8
B. Challenges to the Constitutionality of Wetlands Regulatory Statutes
In early decisions, courts tended to view wetlands regulations as being too
restrictive because the wetlands owner was deprived of virtually all productive
uses of his property.9" These decisions seemed to be particularly sensitive to dis-
covering attempts by the government to take property under the guise of regula-
tion.1"' Morris County Land Improvement Company v. Township of Parsip-
pany-Troy Hills' is one widely cited early wetlands decision in which the con-
stitutionality of a township zoning ordinance restricting the use'02 of privately
94 260 U.S. 393, 417 (Brandeis J., dissenting).
95 369 U.S. 590.
96 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (emphasis added).
97 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Petitioner's property was diminished
in value from $800,000 to $60,000.
98 These courts may have recognized Goldblatt as involving strong elements of public
nuisance. The suggestion of a public nuisance rationale is one possible explanation for the
Court's return to the pre-Pennsylvania Coal evaluation criteria.
99 Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (The
permitted floodplain uses provided the owner with no means of obtaining an economic return
fo- his property). Accord Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24. 282 A.2d 907 (1971).
"Other than public boat. landings and ditches, neither of which would appear to be a private
activity, the plaintiff's use of his property is practically nonexistent unless he happens to own a
boat.... Id. at 31, 282 A.2d at 910.
100 Commissioner of Natural Resources v. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 110-11, 206
N.E.2d 666, 671 (1965), quoting Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15
N.E.2d 587 (1938). "IT]he restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of
taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden." Id. at 230-31, 15
N.E. 2d at 592.
101 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
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owned interior wetlands was examined. The New Jersey Supreme Court unan-
imously concluded that the prime object of the zoning regulations was to
preserve the land in its natural statte:
It is... legally of the highest significance, that the main purpose of enacting
regulations with the practical effect of retaining the meadows in their natural
state was for a public benefit.'
Perceiving that the regulations were enacted to provide protection from flooding
and to preserve open space, the court determined that the situation clearly mani-
fested a governmental appropriation of private property for the benefit of the
public. Thus, the statute was struck down as unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that important dicta from a recent decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court appears to signal a deliberate move away from the Morris
County decision. 4
At the state level, Maine was one of the first states to grapple with the con-
stitutional problems evolving from the statutory protection of coastal marshes.
In State v. Johnson... the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine examined the denial
of a permit which had requested permission to fill a privately owned wetland.
The court viewed the issue as one requiring the balancing of:
[T]he public interest in braking and eventually stopping the insidious despo-
liation of our natural resources ... and the protection of appellants' property
rights .... 106
This balancing test led the court to conclude that the appellants would bear more
than their share of the conservation program costs; the compensation they would
receive from the program's benefits would be disproportionate to the deprivation
of their reasonable use of the property." 7
The "reasonable" and "practical use" criteria were continued by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of
Duxbury."'° The MacGibbon plaintiff originally applied in 1962 for a wetlands
development permit. The application conformed with the requirements of a
by-law enacted to protect and preserve the town's natural resources. A pattern
of denial, appeal, and remand then occurred until in 1976 the Supreme Judicial
102 A selected list of the uses permitted under the new regulations included:- "agricultural
uses . . . raising of aquatic plants, fish and fish food . . . conservation uses . . . hunting and
fishing preserves .. " Id. at 545, 193 A.2d at 236.
103 Id. at 553, 193 A.2d at 242.
104 The New Jersey Supreme Court went out of its way to proffer the following com-
mentary in AMG Assoc. v. Township of Springfield, 65 N.J. 101, 319 A.2d 705 (1974):
"The approach to the taking problem, and the result, may be different where vital ecological
and environmental considerations of recent cognizance have brought about rather drastic land
use restriction in furtherance of a policy designed to protect important public interests wide in
scope and territory, as for example, the coastal wetlands act, N.J.S.A. 13:9A-1 et. seq., and
various kinds of flood plain use regulation. Cases arising in such a context may properly call
for a reexamination of some of the statements 10 years ago in the largely locally limited
Morris County Land case, supra (40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232)." Id. at 112, 319 A.2d at 711
n.4.
105 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
106 Id. at 716.
107 If this rationale were to be extended, it would seem that everyone should bear a com-
mensurate share of the burden necessary to secure public good--a concept closely aligned
with the principle underlying the power of eminent domain.
108 340 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. 1976).
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Court ruled that the permit should be granted. Essentially, the court's primary
concern was that no practical use of the property remained for the plaintiff."0 9
Although permitted uses included recreation and agriculture,"' the court found
these, and a list of uses suggested during the proceedings in the lower court to be
lacking in practicality:
[B]ird watching, hiking. .. looking at the water ...just simple pride of
ownership, . . . flying model airplanes or kites, growing marsh hays ... to
protect the view, to provide a view ...conservation. .... I-"
Several significant factors emerge from the aforementioned cases. First, the
courts have adhered to the concept that a private landowner's rights cannot be
sacrificed merely because a greater and broader public interest is at stake.
Second, the courts recognize the landowner's right to use his property in a
practical"2 or productive.' manner, i.e., to gain monetarily from his possession.
However, here the two objectives of wetlands preservation and protection of
individual property rights collide; what the courts may not have appreciated is
that there are few, or no, productive uses that wetlands may serve without under-
going severe modification and losing their basic qualities. Therefore, the question
is whether the state must purchase such wetlands to preserve them or, whether
the public policy considerations override the long-standing right of the property
owner to benefit from the use or sale of his property.
A judicial turn in support of floodplain and wetlands regulations was ap-
parently signaled by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Turnpike
Realty Company, Inc. v. Town of Dedham."4 Although cited in support of wet-
lands legislation, Turnpike Realty was actually a flood hazard zoning decision in
which the constitutionality of regulations preventing plaintiff from developing his
property was examined. Concluding that the flood hazard regulation was not
tantamount to a governmental appropriation, the court indicated that its effect:
(1) protected the upstream and downstream property owners from the increased
flooding that would have resulted had plaintiff received permission to fill," 5 and
(2) reduced the public's burden in funding flood disaster relief. Although the
usesi 6 permitted by the regulation were essentially those found to be impractical
in MacGibbon, the court asserted that the plaintiff had not been deprived of
every beneficial use of his property." 7 In fact the court seemed to rely principally
on a balancing test: in deciding whether an appropriation had occurred, the
severity of the restrictions would be balanced against the potential harm to the
community resulting from overdevelopment of a floodplain." 8
109 The court also noted that plaintiff's property had a fair market value of $5300, but a
potential value of $14,000 if single family residences could be built.
110 Apparently, the reference to agricultural use pertains to the harvesting of salt hay
(Spartina patens) for fodder.
111 340 N.E.2d at 491.
112 Id.
113 Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J.
539, 558, 193 A.2d 232, 243 (1963).
114 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972).
115 Id. at 234, 284 N.E.2d at 899 n.5.
116 The Turnpike Realty bylaw permitted woodland, grassland, wetland, agricultural,
horticultural or recreational uses not requiring filing. Id. at 224, 284 N.E.2d at 894.
117 The discussion of practical uses remaining to the landowner seemed to be almost
iMcidental to the main thrust of the holding. The court also accorded little importance to the
"diminution in value" test even though there was some evidence of an 88% reduction in value.
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The Turnpike Realty holding may be distinguished from wetlands cases
because of at least one important factor. Wetlands protection statutes have been
primarily concerned with the loss of benefit, or the public harm that results from
despoliation of these resources. The harm resulting from flooding however, both
in terms of monetary damage and loss of human life, is more direct and dramatic
than the slow depletion of a valuable resource. Indeed, whether the wetlands
regulation issue can be framed persuasively as one involving a cognizable, definite
and direct harm to the public interest may well have a critical impact on the
trend of future holdings.
A decision from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Sibson v. State,"9
apparently demonstrates that the wetlands restriction issue can be so framed.
The Sibson plaintiff appealed from a denial of permission to fill four acres of
salt marsh. A judicial referee found that plaintiff's proposed activity would ir-
reparably damage an already endangered and diminishing natural resource.
In upholding the permit denial the Sibson court rejected the "diminution in
value" test as being "imprecise and unsuited to the problems involved in the
preservation of wetlands."12 Rather, the court ruled that no taking occurs if the
state makes a valid use of its police power to proscribe activities that could be
harmful to the public. The court then quoted approvingly from one of its recent
decisions where a more liberal measure of the valid extent of the police power
had been advanced: "[T]here is no public taking unless the prohibition deprives
the owner of the only use of his land."1 2'
The Sibson court in part based its holding on the premise that since a sub-
stantial public interest had been shown, the restriction on the individual property
owner would not be unreasonable. Moreover, the court asserted that: (1)
plaintiff had not be deprived of current uses of the marsh, 2 ' and (2) the
permit denial had not depreciated the value of the marshland, apparently
because its value as regulated property that could not be developed was nominal
both before and after the permit denial.' 2 ' Following this reasoning, a marked
depreciation in the property's value must have occurred with the enactment of
the regulatory statute and not when the permit was denied. 2 4 Since it is un-
likely that plaintiffs would have had greater success in challenging the constitu-
tionality of the statute itself, the court's reasoning deprives them of any basis for
recovering on the depreciation question regardless of the merit of the claim.2 5
118 Id. at 235, 284 N.E.2d at 900.
119 336 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1975).
120 Id. at 241.
121 Id. at 242 (emphasis added), quoting Flanagan v. Town of Hollis, 112 N.H. 222, 223,
293 A.2d 328, 329 (1972).
122 Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
123 In sustaining the denial of the permit application the judicial referee found that "[t]he
unfilled portion of the marsh is of practically no pecuniary value to the plaintiffs." Id. at 240.
124 Plaintiffs purchased a six-acre parcel in 1968 for $18,500. In 1972 plaintiffs filled two
acres, constructed a house, and sold the house ($50,000) and the two acres of land ($25,000)
for $75,000. The remaining property, therefore, had more than a "nominal" value before the
statute restricting property use was enacted.
125 If this rationale were to be given free rein, the "diminution in value" test would seem-
ingly be rendered non-functional in wetlands cases. Since the fair market value of the wet-
lands parcel will plummet with the statute's enactment, permit denials in effect would have
no impact on property values. The value of the undeveloped wetland would be the same both
before and after the permit denial.
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While the coastal states have been struggling with the "taking" question,
inland states until recently have not experienced a large amount of wetlands
litigation. This reflects the lack of stringent regulations to curb wetlands develop-
ment and the heretofore lower development pressures associated with many lake-
front as contrasted with oceanfront properties.12 6
A decision from Wisconsin may have pioneered the way for inland states to
enact and enforce stringent wetlands preservation statutes. Just v. Marinette
County'2 ' involved a county ordinance regulating land use around the shores of
county lakes to promote water quality and protect the public's rights in the
navigable lake waters. 2 The ordinance indirectly served to protect wetlands
adjacent to the lakes as a prerequisite to the maintenance of water quality."'
Prior to the passage of the county ordinance, the Justs purchased land
along a navigable lake shoreline. Subsequently, they commenced to fill this
property in violation of the ordinance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court perceived
the basic issue as "a conflict between the public interest in stopping the despolia-
tion of natural resources... , and an owner's asserted right to use his property
as he wishes."'2 0 The issue was thus framed in a strikingly similar manner to
State v. Johnson."' The Just court, however, diverged from the Johnson ratio-
nale in its resolution of the issue. First, the court interpreted the ordinance as re-
stricting the use of property "not to secure a benefit for the public, but to prevent
a harm. . . .""' The court then stated that police power is not confiscatory if
the use to be restricted would harm the general public. Allowing wetlands .de-
velopment would cause a harm to the general public because of the loss of a
valuable state resource. The purpose of the regulation therefore, was not to
acquire something for the public good but to prevent activity harmful to the
public.
Significant also is the court's assertion that an owner may not have the
right to alter land significantly from its natural state:
An owner of land has no absolute . . . right to change the essential natural
character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited
in its natural state and which injures the rights of others.' 33
The court's approach seems heavily laden with recent doctrine from land
use planning and conservancy ethics, and represents a major departure from
126 Developmental pressures are now increasing because of population migration to non-
urban areas and the impact of the "second home" cultural phenomenon.
127 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761.
128 The ordinance was authorized by Wisconsin's Water Quality Act of 1965 and enacted
in conformance with state-developed regulations.
129 The Marinette County ordinance required the issuance of a permit to engage in filling,
draining or dredging of wetlands. Uses that did not require a permit included: harvesting of
wild crops, sustained yield forestry, hunting, fishing, hiking trails, etc. 201 N.W.2d at 765-66
n.4.
130 201 N.W.2d at 767.
131 See text accompanying note 105 supra.
132 201 N.W.2d at 767.
133 This rationale sounds of a return to public nuisance theory. One commentator reports
that while courts can prohibit actions of a private property owner which represent nuisances,
prior warning of what is or is not a nuisance is essential. Michelman, Property, Utility and




most previous wetlands holdings. 4 The rights of a landowner to use his property
in a socially acceptable way have traditionally been closely guarded; the Wiscon-
sin court appears to have subordinated this right in the face of a somewhat
amorphous concept of public harm.
The court does not attempt to balance the magnitude of environmental
harm against the owner's rights but rests instead on the general knowledge that
some harm will result. However, any change in the natural character of the
land or land cover will cause some public harm: tilling the land for agricultural
uses likely will cause increased erosion and eventually result in siltation of navi-
gable water bodies, while clearing timber from natural woodland areas may have
a similar effect. Thus, the court's reasoning that the landowner's traditional
rights must be subordinated because modification of the land will cause public
harm, seems to be fluid and without definite boundaries. Moreover, the
property's physical makeup, under the court's logic, may exert a controlling
influence over the landowner's prerogatives." 5
The Just holding relies on the proposition that the objective of the ordi-
nance is avoidance of public harm rather than public improvement."' This
assertion, if successfully attacked, could lessen the effect of the court's holding in
future litigation. One of the purposes underlying the ordinance was to "prevent
and control water pollution.""'  The recognized capacity of wetlands to
ameliorate water pollution" 8 strongly suggests that the preservation of wetlands
should provide a significant public benefit-abatement of existing and future
water pollution. Following this argument, the restriction appears to be targeted
towards improving the public health, contrary to the court's conclusion." 9 Also,
the court's statement that the preservation of nature does not improve the public
condition but merely maintains the environmental status quo seems questionable.
Would the court also contend that the government's acquisition of vast acreages of
pristine wilderness does not improve the public condition or serve the public
interest?
Despite these criticisms, the court's far-sighted views certainly seem more
conducive to necessary environmental protection than the more narrow, case-by-
case approach of MacGibbon. The development of wetlands parcels may not
represent a significant enough public harm to be judicially recognized on an
individual basis, but such an incremental approach can only serve to defeat the
very purpose for which protective legislation was enacted.
If meaningful environmental protection is to result from wetlands regula-
134 In upholding the validity of the ordinance, the court thinly distinguished Dooley,
Morris County, State v. Johnson and MacGibbon. The court then embraced the Turnpike
Realty decision as analogous to the Just facts even though that decision was concerned with
flood plain and not wetlands zoning.
135 "[W]e think it is not an unreasonable exercise of [ the police] power to prevent harm
to public rights by limiting the use of private property td its natural uses." 201 N.W.2d at 768
(emphasis added).
136 "This is not, in a legal sense, a gain or a securing of a benefit by the maintaining of
the natural status quo of the environment." 201 N.W.2d at 768.
137 201 N.W.2d at 765 n.1.
138 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
139 The court states that: "Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to eradicate the
present pollution and to prevent further pollution in its navigable waters." 201 N.W.2d at 768
(emphasis added). The court later maintains however, that the ordinance doesn't "improve
the public condition but only preserves nature ... ." 201 N.W.2d at 771.
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tions, it appears that courts must either take a broader view of what are
"practical" uses of the wetlands, or must embrace the concept that public good
may sometimes outweigh the wetland owner's right to the productive use of his
property-essentially the theory underlying the Just and Sibson decisions.
Whether the courts of the interior states adopt the Just-Sibson approaches, or
whether they follow the more conservative Morris County-MacGibbon line of
decisions may well depend on the safeguards incorporated into interior wetlands
protection statutes.
C. Wetlands Statutes for the Interior States
The above decisions illustrate the constitutional "taking" question which
emerged from the challenge of regulatory statutes. Sands Point Harbor, Inc. v.
Sullivan.4 ° discusses an important statutory safeguard used to parry constitutional
challenges. In Sands Point Harbor the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, rejected the plaintiff's contention that the Wetlands Act of 1970 was
unconstitutional because it severely restricted those uses permissible in wetlands
areas. The fact that the statutory regulations were implemented through a
flexible permit application system was important to the holding. In evidence
of this flexibility, the court observed that only a very limited number of uses
were absolutely prohibited. 4 ' Significantly, the court noted that although
permits were required for a series of regulated activities, the permit system had
been successfully used by several applicants. 4' This demonstrated that the system
was a functioning mechanism and not a shell intended to convey merely .the
impicssion of constitutionality. Moreover, the Wetlands Act also provided a
means:; for challenging permit denials through commencement of an.action in the
Superior Court. 4'
The permit method was apparently designed in part to avoid the Morris
County type of problem that resulted from overly rigid and inflexible regulations.
Many statutes also incorporate public hearings to review permit applications,
4 4
a process that tends to satisfy procedural due process requirements.'4 5
Statutes or proposed statutes to regulate interior wetlands however, may not
include such safeguards. For example, Indiana's proposed wetlands act does not
provide for public hearings.'46 While this might give rise to constitutional chal-
lenges, the proposed act would at least adopt the more practical and modem
biological approach to wetlands regulation. Indeed, the proposed act makes no
140 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346 A.2d 612 (1975).
141 Absolutely prohibited were dumping of solid wastes, the discharging of sewage and the
storage or application of pesticides. Id. at 441, 346 A.2d at 614.
142 Id.
143 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-6 (West Supp. 1975-76).
144 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701, 4707 (1974).
145 Prior to holding such public hearings, notice is given through newspapers in the county
of the affected situs. N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 25-0402(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
Typically, fines are imposed for refusal to comply with these regulations; N.Y. ENV5R.
CONSERV. LAW § 25-0501 (McKinney Supp. 1974); one state at least has followed the lead of
surface mining laws by requiring the equivalent of a performance (or more appropriately here,
conformance) bond. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 727 (Supp. 1970). See Note, State Land
Use Regulation-A Survey of Recent Legislative Approaches, 56 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1972)
for an excellent overview of this area.
146 H.B. 2074, Indiana General Assembly (1977).
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mention of engineering specifications, but defines wetlands by the presence of wet-
lands vegetation." Descriptions of what comprises wetlands vegetation, i.e.,
applicable wetlands species, however, were not included. Seemingly, a more
specific definition was not provided because the draftsmen intended to build a
large amount of flexibility into the act. Thus, criteria used to identify wetlands
could be shaped to fit the exigencies of any wetlands environment subject, of
course, to operating within the overall purpose of the legislation. 4 '
Although the advantages to the state from this type of approach are clear,
the disadvantages to private landowners are no less noteworthy. For example,
no universally accepted definition of "wetlands vegetation" exists, nor does the
proposed act supply a list of exemplary species. Therefore, the private landowner
must determine at his own risk whether his property conforms with the definition
and risk proceeding in land development projects subject to state inspection and
penalty. This type of broad definitional approach raises the possibility of con-
stitutional attack on the grounds that the act would not be sufficiently definite
to provide fair notice of what would constitute unlawful conduct."4 9
Finally, interior statutes will also be subjected to attack on the "taking"
question. Several coastal states have fitted their wetlands legislation with
provisions enabling the property owner to challenge the propriety of permit
denials by bringing an action in the local courts.' Other statutes go further by
granting to the state the right to purchase land titles or easements in the event the
court upholds the plaintiff's challenge. 5' Thus, the state may still exercise its
right to eminent domain even if the denial of a permit application is held to be
unconstitutionally confiscatory.
IV. Alternatives
The solid split in decisions involving wetlands regulation indicates that the
central issue of whether wetland owners have been deprived of property without
just compensation almost certainly has not been resolved, nor has a reliable trend
been established. If the asserted use of broad police powers to protect dwindling
resources is held to be excessive, it may be necessary to examine other alternatives
for preserving wetlands.
At the federal level, the Water Bank Act of 1970 offers the prospect of
agreements between the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture and .wetlands property own-
147 "Wetland" is defined as "land where the water table is at, near, or above the land
surface with such frequency as to be normally characterized by a prevalence of wetland vegeta-
tion. Wetland vegetation means those various plant species adapted for growth and reproduc-
tion in water or in saturated soils." H.B. 2074, Indiana General Assembly (1977).
148 Detractors stated that the bill gave the Dept. of Natural Resources excessive latitude in
the creation and enforcement of wetlands regulations. Goshen News, Feb. 21, 1977, at 2,
col. 1. The bill has since been withdrawn.
149 See Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972), where the fair notice argument was unsuccessfully
raised against a more definitive statute.
150 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-6 (West Supp. 1975-76).
151 N.Y. ENVsa. CONSERv. LAW § 25-0404 (McKinney Supp. 1974): "In the event that the
court may find that the determination of the commissioner constitutes the equivalent of a
taking without just compensation, . . . it may, at the election of the commissioner, either set
aside the order or require the commissioner to acquire the tidal wetlands . . . , proceeding
under the power of eminent domain."
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ers."5 ' As with farm subsidies, wetlands property owners would receive govern-
ment payments in return for maintaining wetlands in a natural condition. The
payments are limited to the. preservation of interior wetlands, and represent a
legislative attempt to assure the existence of sufficient nesting sites for migratory
wildfowl. This Act, while limited in its own scope, suggests an approach that
may be utilized by state or local governments to preserve what they deem to be
critical resources.
A similar type of program could be implemented through the use of eminent
domain, or the purchasing of easements or development rights. Some state
agencies are reluctant to employ eminent domain since it mandates the forfeiture
of all the private landowner's rights in his property at the behest of the govern-
ment. The private citizenry may tend to regard this .activity as government
"strong-arming." The purchasing of development rights on the other hand at
least offers the potential for a mutually satisfactory settlement between citizen
and government. The payment of a nominal amount in many cases may leave
the citizen with the valid impression that he is assisting in resource preservation
while receiving a benefit for his contribution.
As one additional source of funding, many states are taking advantage of
federal grants available through the Coastal Zone Management Act.'53 Annual
grants are available to support those states which develop coastal zone manage-
ment programs. Although the grants are only available to coastal states, a
surprisingly large number of states qualify, principally because the Great Lakes
are considered coastal water bodies for the purpose of the act. 5
Another approach that could be implemented at the state, or more probably
the local level, is the use of government subsidies in conjunction with tax reduc-
tions. If the government usurps all productive use of a property, it seems equit-
able that it should desist from levying taxes on that property.
In perspective, the principal uses and values of wetlands-pollution abate-
ment, flood control, commercial and sport fishing, open space, wildlife habitat,
etc.-are primarily public in nature. Since the benefits are public, the burden
of conservation would seem to be more properly borne by the public rather than
the individual landowner. For the long term, perhaps the most equitable solu-
tion lies in the on-going wetlands acquisition programs initiated by a number of
states.'55 Because these programs are funded through the tax dollar, the public
is effectively paying for the benefits it receives from the preservation of wetlands.
Such programs may not be able to function rapidly enough, however to signifi-
cantly halt accelerating wetlands depletion. Therefore, it is likely that wetlands
protection statutes at the state level will continue to be one of the most widely
used tools to preserve this dwindling natural resource.
Kenneth R. Martin
152 Water Bank Act of 1970, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311 (1970).
153 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. II, 1972).
154 See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
155 See Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATRE L. REv.
357 (1970). At least six states have substantial land acquisition programs.
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